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Setting the Sun on the British Empire:  








Ruled under the Union Jack from 1841 to 1997, the British 
acquired Hong Kong during the second wave of European 
colonialism focused on Asia. Along with countries such as 
Germany, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands, Britain looked for 
new areas to provide support for mercantile capitalism and 
manufacturing developments. Under Britain’s 154 years of rule, the 
stable nature of British government systems and thorough economic 
investments caused Hong Kong to become a wealthy international 
trade center in the twentieth century. Despite these economic 
investments and interests, the nature of the New Territories Lease 
under which Britain acquired the totality of Hong Kong, which was 
to expire in 1997, opened the question of who was to control Hong 
Kong. The effect of the Cold War on Britain’s empire greatly 
influenced Britain’s approach to the question of the colony’s future 
sovereignty. With rapid decolonization and the rise of communism 
in East Asia threatening Britain’s leading world role by the mid-
twentieth century, officials recognized the role Hong Kong played 
in Britain’s economic policy, including with the potential of the 
developing East Asian market. With this realization, Britain aimed 
to protect these interests by preserving elements of Hong Kong’s 
capitalist economic system during the decolonization negotiations 
and resulting legislation in the 1980s. Although their approach to 
Hong Kong’s decolonization aimed to safeguard British interests 
and provide for a better relationship with China, the official 
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British Economic Interests and the Acquisition of Hong Kong 
 
 The tension leading up to the Opium Wars spurred British 
economic interests in the Hong Kong region. Ultimately, the First 
Opium War began a chain reaction of European imperialist 
domination over Qing China during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.1 By the mid-nineteenth century, British officials recognized 
the market potential trade which China held, but China’s heavy 
restrictions on trade with “barbarian” European countries were a 
blow to the British economy. British importation of Chinese tea, 
porcelain, spices, and silk under these heavy restrictions drained the 
Treasury of gold and silver specie.2 In order to preserve economic 
investments in the area, the British sought to gain freer access to the 
Chinese market. At this time, Hong Kong was a base for British 
traders, merchants, and, perhaps most importantly, opium dealers. 
The opium trade expanded rapidly in the 1820s and 1830s after the 
British gained Bengal in 1757. In order to balance Chinese imports, 
British merchants sold opium in Chinese regions such as Hong 
Kong.3 However, the opium trade was met with backlash from 
Chinese officials, as the use of silver to pay for the drug and the 
population’s increasing opium addiction undermined the Chinese 
economy and national morale.4 In an attempt to combat the opium 
trade, the Chinese increased measures against it, and Qing forces 
began confiscating and destroying thousands of chests of British 
opium. Queen Victoria responded by sending the first expeditionary 
force to Hong Kong, starting the First Opium War in 1839.  
 British forces defeated the Qing forces and occupied Hong 
Kong Island in 1841. The Treaty of Nanking, signed in 1842 and 
ratified in 1843, put an end to “consequent hostilities” between the 
two countries. In the treaty, the Qing Emperor ceded Hong Kong 
Island “in perpetuity” to Great Britain, allowing it to be governed by 
British laws and regulations to govern it as a Crown Colony.5  
Article III of the treaty catered to British economic interests in Hong 
Kong, stating that “it being obviously necessary and desirable that 
British subjects should have some port whereat they may careen and 
refit their ships when required and keep stores for that purpose.”6 
The British aims during the war were closely linked to their 
economic interests and prospects in the region, including “the 
opening of four or five Chinese ports to a freer British trade.”7 
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Access to these ports in and around Hong Kong would give British 
merchants not only a common place to dock, but also access to 
established markets on the Chinese mainland. Through the cession 
of territory in the treaty, British officials wanted to make Hong Kong 
an area for cultural exchange and free trade between the Chinese and 
British and with other European countries. In 1843, Governor John 
Francis Davis described the prospects of Hong Kong stating that  
 
There is a real British colony (no Portuguese 
counterfeit) planted on the very threshold of China. 
There they may see commerce flourishing in the 
absence of restrictions, property and person secure 
under the protection of equal laws, and, in a word, all 
the best fruits of science and civilization transplanted 
direct from the European headquarters. The good or 
evil may do there will, by the law of inevitable 
necessity, react upon ourselves.8 
 
 Britain’s desire to open the Chinese mainland markets led to 
the Second Opium War in 1856. After the Chinese detained ships 
protected under the British flag, British and French forces attacked 
Chinese forces. The British sought to legalize the opium trade, open 
more ores to European, specifically British, trade, and to establish 
diplomatic representation in Beijing to aid in discussions of trade 
and economic policy.9 After the European forces sacked Beijing in 
1860, both sides agreed to the Convention of Peking, which ceded 
the Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Island “in perpetuity” to 
Great Britain.10 Although a relatively small piece of land, the 
Kowloon Peninsula proved to be strategically important, as it was 
situated at the entrance to Hong Kong harbor. With the Convention 
opening more ports to British trade, the acquisition of the Kowloon 
Peninsula gave the British control of activities in Hong Kong 
Island’s harbor.11  
 Britain acquired its third and final parcel of land in the Hong 
Kong region in 1898. Despite obtaining the Kowloon Peninsula’s 
strategic location in 1860, the British were concerned with defense 
of their Hong Kong ports and looked to secure the area surrounding 
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. The opportunity came after China 
was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, in which 
3
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Britain demanded to lease the territory to Kowloon’s north and other 
neighboring islands.12 Under the Second Convention of Peking, 
Britain gained the aforementioned “New Territories” in a ninety-
nine year, rent-free lease valid until 30 June 1997.13 Other European 
nations demanded territory from coastal China after their defeat, but 
Great Britain gained the biggest and most strategically important 
parcels of land through the convention. With future economic 
developments and expansions in the region, the New Territories 
provided most of the needed resources, including water, power 
supplies, and space for manufacturing.14 Ultimately, the New 
Territories became the spark making Britain’s economic goals 
prosper.  
 
British Economic Developments and the Role of the Cold War 
in the Approach to the Hong Kong Question  
 
 Today, Hong Kong is one of the four Tiger economies along 
with Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore due to rapid economic 
growth and an increasing standard of living.15 Hong Kong is 
considered to be one of the world’s most advanced financial, 
trading, and transportation centers and is considered to be the bridge 
between both China and the West and Asia and the rest of the 
world.16 Since the 1980s, Hong Kong has ranked in top positions on 
the World Competitiveness Report and in the Index of Economic 
Freedom. Economists highlight its defining features as a free market 
economy with private ownership, non-interventionism in economic 
affairs on the part of the government, wealth used to develop a sound 
welfare and social service system, expenditure reduction to below 
twenty percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a fully-
backed currency system pegged to the United States dollar, and 
extensive foreign exchange reserves.17 According to former Hong 
Kong Financial Secretary Donald Tsang, Britain’s economic 
policies revolved primarily around seven different rules, including 
  
the “living-within-our-means” rule; maintaining 
adequate ate fiscal reserves; a low, simple, and 
predictable tax system; a rigorous user-pays system 
for fees and charges to underpin the low tax regime; 
combating tax avoidance and tax evasion; providing 
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tax concessions where most needed; and avoiding 
fueling inflation.18 
 
 Although these factors define Hong Kong’s presence on the 
world stage today as a strong capitalist economy, Hong Kong’s 
rapid economic growth has roots in the years after the Second World 
War. The Second World War was a major blow to British control of 
Hong Kong, as Japan occupied the colony from December 1941 to 
September 1945. Despite tensions over the question of Hong Kong, 
China and Britain were allies during World War II. However, in 
1942, Britain rejected Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek’s request 
for the return of Hong Kong. Britain said that any negotiations over 
Hong Kong would only come as a part of a general settlement with 
its other Asian colonies. China’s demand for Hong Kong was 
supported by American President Franklin Roosevelt, who stated 
that under the Atlantic Charter of 1943, all peoples living under 
colonial rule were to have their “sovereign rights and self- 
government restored.”19 Britain refused once more, but promised 
they would reconsider the question once the war was over. However, 
Hong Kong was not included in China’s territories gained as a victor 
in the war, instead getting Taiwan, which had been under Japanese 
rule since 1895.20 With the rise of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 1949, the debate over the Hong Kong question increased 
as ideological differences between interested parties increasingly 
diverged.  
 
British Cold War Interests in Hong Kong 
 
 For the British, their approach to Hong Kong was influenced 
by three primary factors: the rise of Chinese communism and 
nationalism, the expansion of economic developments in Hong 
Kong, and the decolonization of British holdings. With a rapidly 
decreasing colonial presence and the rising threat of communism 
and nationalism, Britain attempted to resuscitate its diminishing 
power on the world stage and in East Asia by developing a sound 
capitalist economic system in Hong Kong. As of 1949, the Colonial 
Office stated that the amount of British capital invested in Hong 
Kong was around £156 million, emphasizing the potential Hong 
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Kong held for further expansion and how it benefited Britain’s 
empire as a whole.21 
 The rise of Chinese communism and nationalism was a 
central threat in the minds of British officials after World War II. In 
1946, the British Foreign and Colonial Offices created a joint 
memorandum about the future of Hong Kong and outlined the 
different perspectives regarding how to approach the question of 
Hong Kong’s sovereignty. In the opening paragraph, the 
memorandum recognizes the initial importance of the New 
Territories Lease as a means of solidifying “proper defence and 
protection of the colony,” but emphasizes that after the war, 
preserving the lease would be beneficial in creating stronger 
“economic intercommunication” in the colony.22 The question of 
whether or not Britain should take the initiative in negotiations about 
Hong Kong was greatly influenced by the increase of Chinese 
nationalism associated with the rise of the CCP. For the British, the 
rise of nationalism in China meant the increased danger that Hong 
Kong would fall victim to Chinese propaganda. Internationally, the 
British feared the Chinese government would consequently request 
the full return of the colony to Chinese sovereignty, leaving the 
British with decreased influence and control of the region. With 
their long-term goal of “freedom of commercial opportunity in 
China and the Far East”, the rise of the CCP could limit Britain’s 
expansion from Hong Kong to other markets in East Asia.23 After 
the Second World War, the economy of Hong Kong relied on 
entrepôt trade and the distribution of products, as the British had not 
yet invested in the manufacturing and service sectors that would 
define Hong Kong’s economy in from the 1960s onward.24 
Although well underway in the shift to a manufacturing economy, 
China’s nationalist claims to Hong Kong could damage the use of 
the colony as a base for British trade and expansion. Prior to the 
rapid decolonization of British holdings in the region, Hong Kong 
was Britain’s main territory facilitating trade with its other Asian 
colonies, such as Malaysia.25 
 Rapid decolonization after the Second World War greatly 
influenced Britain’s approach to the Hong Kong question during the 
Cold War. Prior to the Second World War, Britain had conquered 
territories in most parts of the world, including Borneo, Burma, 
India, Ceylon, and Malaya in Asia.26 These Asian colonies were 
6
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 9 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/3
 23 
essential to Britain, as they not only provided resources for the 
mother country, but they also provided Britain with access to the 
various Asian markets. In Asian colonies such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore, the colonies had the bonus of providing Britain with 
naval bases for the Royal Navy, Britain’s other prime method of 
maintaining world power. Both World Wars left Britain extremely 
weak and unable to invest as many resources into its imperial 
holdings. Combined with the colonies’ contributions of troops and 
resources to the British war effort, Britain’s overseas colonies 
experienced several nationalist and independence movements that 
resulted in decolonization in many parts of the empire, particularly 
Africa and Asia. As its number of colonies decreased, Britain’s grip 
on world power waned. With the Cold War, a new world order 
emerged, with the United States and the Soviet Union taking the 
helm of the bi-polar conflict. Since it started its colonization process, 
Britain had always considered its colonies to be significant to its 
presence on the world stage, with economic and political control 
over various colonies providing Britain with the wealth and 
resources it needed to be a leading player in world politics. 
However, losing colonies such as India immediately after World 
War Two meant that Britain lacked the needed resources to maintain 
its status as a major player. It could fall to become a second-rate 
player behind the United States and the Soviet Union.27 With Hong 
Kong as one of its last major holdings in East Asia, Britain feared 
that losing Hong Kong would set a precedent for future claims to 
independence by its remaining colonial holdings.28  
 The fears outlined in the 1946 Joint Memorandum set the 
stage for Britain’s approach to Hong Kong from the 1950s to the 
early 1980s. Recognizing the weakness of Hong Kong’s entrepôt 
trade-focused economy, Britain sought to expand its industrial 
capacity in the early 1950s. Britain’s expansion plan included the 
introduction of industrial plants combined with increased export of 
these manufactured goods. Under this plan, Hong Kong would no 
longer rely simply on distributing imports and exports coming 
through Hong Kong’s ports, but would also create a new opportunity 
for increased investment. With an increased industrial capacity, 
Britain had more control over the amount of capital invested in the 
process and also controlled the amount of revenue earned from the 
various manufacturing plants. This control over the manufacturing 
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process and the types of goods allowed Britain to tailor its 
production to suit the most valuable goods circulating in the world 
market. They could also identify the types of goods missing from 
the market, produce them in a streamlined, cost-efficient manner, 
and introduce them to the market to make more revenue by filling a 
void. This flexible approach to manufacturing allowed Hong Kong 
to expand beyond the immediate East Asian market and its 
connection with Britain, with Hong Kong establishing trade ties 
with the United States, one of the biggest economies in the world 
during the 1960s and to the present day.29 By 1966, a year where the 
GDP per capita was $4,776 million and exports were around $5,729 
million, textiles accounted for fifty-two percent of domestically 
produced products.30  
 In the 1970s and the early 1980s, Britain shifted to 
incorporate the financial sector into Hong Kong’s economy. This 
included the establishment of large insurance companies and 
twenty-four-hour banks focused on supporting international trade 
and foreign investment. With foreign trade supported by Hong 
Kong’s ports, foreign banks also expanded their overseas operations 
to include branches in the colony.31 This combination of the 
financial sector and the manufacturing plants caused economic 
growth to increase rapidly, with the GDP continuing to rise, exports 
increasing in value, and the unemployment rate to decrease. 
Economists call Britain’s approach to capitalist economic expansion 
in this time “consensus capitalism,” which viewed maximizing 
economic opportunity as a defense of “political liberty” and 
encouraging an “equality of opportunity” for all.32 Financial 
Secretary Sir Hamish Macleod justified Britain’s “consensus 
capitalist” investments by saying  
  
[there is] a consensus about the need to encourage 
free enterprise and competition, while promoting 
equity and assistance for those who need it. 
Enterprise, because that is what gives dynamism to 
our economy. Equity, because the community rightly 
expects a fair deal for everyone, and in particular that 
raw competition be tempered by help for those less 
able to compete.33 
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 For Britain, these economic developments were an attempt 
to safeguard British economic interests and their waning influence 
in the East Asian region. Facing rapid decolonization and the threat 
of Chinese nationalism, economic expansion was the most 
reasonable and cost-efficient way to maintain control over Hong 
Kong. Despite these economic developments reflecting Britain’s 
strong influence in the colony, Britain had another hurdle to face by 
the 1980s: the 1997 expiration of the New Territories Lease. 
Keeping in mind the impact of these economic developments and 
their connection to future market interests, Britain turned its 
attention to leveraging these factors into negotiation talks over the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong. 
 
The Long 1980s: Sino-British Negotiations and Basic Law 
  
 With the 1997 expiration date of the New Territories Lease 
approaching, negotiations about the future of Hong Kong’s 
sovereignty began to take shape. Proper negotiations about Hong 
Kong did not occur before the 1980s, despite Mao Zedong’s repeal 
of the Nationalist government’s approach, instead focusing on 
discussing the question when conditions were “ripe.”34 It was not 
until Deng Xiaoping became Chairman after Mao’s death in 1976 
that China’s government shifted policies to favor negotiations about 
Hong Kong. As a part of its modernization policy, the government 
approved a three-point policy toward the Hong Kong question in 
1981 that focused on acquiring sovereignty over Hong Kong in a 
way that would allow the region to service China’s economic and 
political strategies.35 With this in mind, Deng implemented the 
concept of “one country, two systems”. Initially meant to apply to 
Taiwan and Macao, the concept revolved around “one China”, but 
with distinct Chinese regions with their own economic and 
administrative systems, while the rest of the PRC used communism 
with Chinese characteristics.36 In a 1984 Beijing Review, officials 
wrote that  
 
[A]utonomy will be achieved under the unified state 
sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China. The 
concept of ‘one country, two systems’ should never 
be understood as ‘two sovereigns in one country’ or 
9
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‘two mutually exclusive political entities in one 
country,’ as some people have claimed. Our aim is to 
consolidate the unification of the nation, not its 
permanent separation.37 
 
 For the Chinese government, this unification could be 
achieved by creating special administrative regions, which would, 
ideally, coincide with the autonomy wishes of both the government 
and the nation in which negotiations over territory were being held. 
Incorporating this idea into legislation, Article 31 of the PRC’s 
Constitution stated that “the state may establish special 
administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted 
in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted 
by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific 
conditions”.38 
 With China more open to approaching the Hong Kong 
question, the stage was set for the initial negotiations about 
sovereignty after 1997. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 
September 1982 visit to Beijing was seen as a step toward amiable 
negotiations, as it was the first visit by an incumbent prime minister 
to the PRC. However, Thatcher, in the wake of British victory in the 
Falklands, insisted that despite Chinese perspective of the 
Convention of Peking and Treaty of Nanking as “unequal”, the 
treaties were “valid in international law”.39 After hearing that the 
British wanted to retain sovereignty over Hong Kong, China took a 
hard stance and insisted that their sovereignty over the colony was 
not negotiable. The deadlock in negotiations sparked a currency 
crisis, as the Hong Kong dollar (approximately $1 USD to $7.8 
HKD) dropped twenty percent in just over a week. After pegging 
the HKD to the United States Dollar to avoid a further crisis, British 
officials realized that in order to progress negotiations, they had to 
change their goal for Hong Kong’s future.40 
 Despite tense negotiations, officials on both sides realized 
the two countries held some common ground. Despite individual 
differences on both sides, the general consensus was that both China 
and Great Britain wanted to develop amiable relations with one 
another. For China, this was a recent development stemming from 
Deng’s modernization policies. In the early 1980s, Beijing felt as if 
it was time for China to emphasize a more independent yet neutral 
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image from its early Cold War actions of associating itself with the 
United States. As the threat of the Soviet Union declined, China 
viewed economic relations as key to their modernization plans, 
especially after Deng introduced a free-market economy. This 
economic modernization included strengthening relations with the 
West, particularly with Britain and the European Community. As 
one of the leading figures in the European market, China viewed 
developing relations with Britain as a step toward creating a link 
with the West as a whole.41  
 Britain’s interests were extremely similar. Despite making 
expansive developments through Hong Kong’s economic system, 
the British sought to have both another outlet and trading partner for 
their Hong Kong investments. They also sought another market to 
invest in themselves. Although communism was an initial concern, 
this shifted to focus primarily on the Soviet Union’s influence after 
Deng implemented his modernization policies. British and Chinese 
interests first converged in this desire to counter Soviet influence in 
East Asia in order to safeguard their interests. These interests later 
converged again when Thatcher encouraged economic relations in 
East Asia and the Pacific, particularly the new industrializing 
countries of Taiwan, Singapore, and Taiwan, three of the future 
Tiger Economies. Britain recognized that Deng’s modernization 
policies made China an important economic player in the East Asian 
market. Rather than compete with them for influence in the region, 
officials aimed to create a better Sino-British relationship not only 
to benefit Britain’s activities in the East Asian market as a whole, 
but also to protect their investments in Hong Kong post-1997. 42 
Through their negotiations about Hong Kong’s sovereignty, both 
China and Great Britain were shaping their future relationships with 
each other.43 Recognizing this commonality in market expansions 
and investments, Britain softened its line on sovereignty and instead 
focused on Hong Kong’s economic system. 
 In 1984’s final round of negotiations, Britain focused on 
preserving Hong Kong’s existing economic and administrative 
system after the transfer of sovereignty. They channeled this focus 
into the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which reflected the common 
interests of both countries in creating a sound relationship with each 
other. The declaration worked toward “strengthening and 
development of the relations between the two countries on a new 
11
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basis” through the "maintenance of the prosperity and stability of 
Hong Kong”.44 The main provision of the treaty was that the PRC 
could not practice its socialist system in Hong Kong, thereby 
protecting the system of “private property, ownership of enterprises, 
legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be 
protected by law”.45 Even though many articles state that Hong 
Kong would continue to support foreign investments and exchanges, 
one article explicitly illustrates both Britain and China’s wishes 
coming in to the final round of negotiations. Article 9 states, “the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may establish mutually 
beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom and other 
countries.”46 Although it caters to China’s modernization goal of 
establishing links with the West, Article 9 overwhelmingly reflects 
Britain’s aim to maintain ties with Hong Kong for economic 
relations as a means of having some form of control in the region. 
As Hong Kong was encouraged to create economic relations with 
other countries, Britain could then use their ties with the former 
colony to create new links with other markets in East Asia. The Joint 
Declaration was signed on 19 December 1984 by PRC Premier Zhao 
Ziyang and Prime Minister Thatcher and was effective on 1 July 
1997 with the expiration of the 1898 New Territories Lease. 
 The Joint Declaration promised to implement these 
agreements into Basic Law, the constitutional document for the 
future HKSAR drafted between 1985 and 1990. Following Article 
31 of the PRC Constitution, Basic Law established the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) on the basis of the Joint 
Declaration.47 Central to its foundation, a stipulation from the 1980s 
negotiations was that the PRC had to agree to the “One Country, 
Two Systems” policies they discussed as integral to their 
modernization policies. Chinese officials pledged in Article 5 that 
these economic policies would remain unchanged for fifty years 
until 30 June 2047:  
 
The socialist system and policies shall not be 
practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, and the previous capitalist system and way 
of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.48 
 
12
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 By preserving the capitalist status quo and affording the 
region a “high degree of autonomy,” Hong Kong could maintain its 
status as an international financial center, a free port, center of free 
trade, and a separate custom territory. Despite the transfer of 
sovereignty, Britain ultimately benefited from the Joint Declaration 
and its translation into Basic Law, as their economic developments 
and future interests were maintained. Although their presence and 
control ended with the effective date of the Joint Declaration, 
Britain’s influence found new residence through Hong Kong’s 
preserved capitalist system and access to economic markets in the 
region. Regards of having to share this region with China, Britain’s 
interests managed to survive decolonization, albeit in a more limited 
form. 
 
Conclusion: Decolonization and the Future of Hong Kong 
 
 On 1 July 1997, Britain officially transferred sovereignty of 
Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China.  Ceremonial events 
ran from 30 June to 1 July and included PRC President Jiang Zemin, 
Prince Charles, Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Governor Chris 
Patten. Key images from the handover include lowering of the 
Union Jack to the tune of “God Save the Queen”, and the departure 
of the HMY Britannia from the former headquarters of British 
Forces Overseas Hong Kong. Although the nature of the handover 
was one of happiness and successful prospects for Hong Kong, the 
former colony’s future is still unsure. The Sino-British Joint 
Declaration is set to expire in 2047, meaning that the “one country, 
two systems” agreement essentially protecting Hong Kong’s 
capitalist system from socialism is no longer valid. With 2047 
approaching, officials and economists try to predict what Hong 
Kong’s future may be at the hands of the PRC. Prospects for the 
future are divided into three major paths, none of which involve full 
Hong Kong independence: China extends the current autonomy as 
an SAR with Basic Law preserving the capitalist system; China will 
revoke Hong Kong’s status as an SAR and it will become a normal 
province with no autonomy; or China will take more middle-of-the-
road approach, with some autonomy privileges preserved and some 
that are not.  
13
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 This uncertain timeline puts the existence of British 
economic investments in Hong Kong in jeopardy.  For Britain, these 
economic investments represented an attempt to preserve its place 
on the world stage. “The Pearl of the East’s” world presence as an 
international finance center and leading market economy reflected 
the pinnacle of capitalist achievement that Britain aimed to be 
known for, as it was a part of its identity as a world leader.49 
Simultaneously, these capitalist characteristics not only reflected, in 
Britain’s eyes, their successful influence in the region, but also 
provided an outlet for Britain’s interests and investments in a time 
when its identity was uncertain. Britain recognized that the Cold 
War, particularly with the rapid decolonization of their colonies in 
Africa and Asia and the rise of Chinese communism and 
nationalism, greatly threatened its grip on global power. Realizing 
that retaining sovereignty over the region was impossible, Britain 
looked to preserve its economic benefits and potential for future 
prospects in the region. Although the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
forced Britain to relinquish sovereignty over Hong Kong, the 
resulting Basic Law attempted to safeguard British interests and 
investments in the region through the preservation of the capitalist 
economic system that they had developed over decades. 
 With the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army and the 
lowering of the Union Jack in 1997, the handover not only ended 
the British presence in Hong Kong, but also brought an end to 
British colonialism in East Asia and to the British Empire as a 
whole. Although Britain still retains control over some overseas 
territories, losing full control of Hong Kong signaled the end of 
Britain’s role as a major world power. For nearly four hundred years, 
Britain’s political control of and economic investment in various 
colonies helped build their presence as a world leader. As its last 
major colonial holding, transferring Hong Kong to China illustrated 
the end of one era of the world order and the dawn of a new world 
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